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LEGAL CONTROL OV MEDICAL PRACTICE:
VALIDITY AND METHODS*
Kenneth C. Searst
INTRODUCTION

Legislators have deemed it necessary, in order to protect the public
interest, to exercise some control over the practice of the healing art by
physicians, surgeons, chiropractors, osteopaths, dentists, etc., both as to
who may practice and in what manner the practice may be carried on.
Legislators have also required, in certain situations, that designated
persons submit to medical treatment. Both types of regulation give rise
to various legal and constitutional problems and it is the purpose of this
paper to discuss some of these problems.
I
LICENSING--DUE PROCESS OF LAW

N HIS qpinion in Lambert v. Yellowley' Mr. Justice Brandeis -ut-

tered the following dictum: "Besides, there is no right to practice
medicine which is not subordinate to the police power ' of the
f
States.... I
* By publishing this article, and the others in'this issue (see infra, pp. 715, 773),
the REvIEw is participating in an extensive symposium entitled "Scientific Proof and

Relations of Law and Medicrie" (second series). This present group of articles is a
continuation of a series published in various law reviews and medical journals in the
Spring of 1943 [see 41 MicH. L. REv. 872 (1943)]. The Editor-in-Chief is Hubert
Winston Smith, A.B., M.B.A., LL.B., M.D., Professor of Legal Medicine, University of Illinois; formerly, Research Associate on the faculties of Harvard Law School
and Harvard Medical School.
An index containing references to articles in both series may b6e obtained from
Professor Smith, Colege of Law, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill. Price 2oc.
" Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
272 U. S. 581, 4-7 S. Ct. 21O (1926).
2Fdr the benefit of the medical profession it is perhaps desirable to state that the
term police power is just one way of expressing the idea that is better expressed by
the words, regulatory power. Sometimes this regulatory power can be extended to a
prohibition.
8 272 U. S. 581 at 596, 47 S. Ct. 2IO (1926).
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One decision cited by Mr. Justice Brandeis to support his dictum
was Dent v. WestVirginia.' That state in 1882 passed a statute which

required every medical practitioner to meet one of three standards:
(i)'a graduate of a reputable medical college; (2) a practitioner in

West Virginia continuously for ten years prior to March 8, 188i; or
(3) pass an examination prepared by the State Board of Health. Dr.
Dent had practiced only since 1876. He had a diploma from the American Medical Eclectic College of Cincinnati, Ohio, but that college had
been determined-by the Board of Health to be not "reputable." Dr.
Dent did not submit himself to the examination of the board. He was
convicted for violating the West Virginia statute. The Supreme Court
of the United States affirmed the conviction and thus determined that
the statute was no violation of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. There are many similar decisions.5
II
REVOCATION OF LICENSES

Licenses to practice medicine may be revoked by a state board.'
The courts generally have refused to hold that statutes conferring this
power violate constitutional provisions. The usual claim has been that
due process was denied. More particularly, it has been argued that
statutes permitting revocation were unconstitutional because the grounds
for revocation werg stated in general terms, such as gross immorality or
unprofessional conduct. Most courts have not been convinced by this
argument.6 Some of them, however, have held that such grounds are
4 129 U. S. 114, 9S . Ct. 231 (1889).

5 Reetz v. Michigan, x88 U. S.505, 23 S. Ct. 390 (1903); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173, 30 S. Ct. 644 (191o)

(due process and equal protection);

Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. z88, 32 S. Ct. z86 (1912) (osteopathy); Crane v. Johnson, 242 U'. S. 339, 37 S.Ct., 176 (1917) (drugless practitioner) ; Douglas v. Noble,
261 U. S. 165, 43 S. Ct. 303 (1923)

(dentists); Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U. S.

425, 47 S.Ct.-i22 (1926) (dentists; see citation of many state decisions); Sage-Allen
Co., Inc. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 179 A. 195 (1935); 98 A.L.R. 905 (935)
(optometry). Cf. People v. Griffith, 28o Ill. 18, 117 N. E. 195 (1917) (act of
1915 to regulate optometry invalid).
6 Meffert v. State Board of Medical kRegistration and Examination, 66 Kan. 710,
72 P. 247 (1903); I L.R.A. (N.S.) 811 (19o6); Richardson v. Simpson, 88 Kan.
684, 129 P. I1Z8 (1913); 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 911 (1913); (dentist); Laughney v.
Maybury, 145 Wash. 146, 259 P. 17 (1927); 54 A.L.R. 400 (1928) (advertising),;
Yoshizawa v. Hewitt, (C.C.A. 9 th, 1931) 52 F. (2d) 411; 79 A.L.R. 323 (1932);
State Dental Examiners v. Savelle, 90 Colo. 177, 8 P. (2d) 693 (1932) 82 A.L.R.
1184 (933); (dentist practising as employee of a corporation); Bell v. Board of

1946 ]

CONTROL OF MEDICAL PRACTICE

so vague as not to give fair notice. Such a defect, according to the minority view, makes a revocation-of-license statute unconstitutional."
III
EQUAL PROTECTION: DISCRIMINATORY REGULATIONS

A. Among the members of the several professions racticing
the healing arts
Statutes regulating members of the several professions practising
the healing arts do not have to treat each profession precisely the same.
The test, when complaint is made that the statutes deny equal protection of the laws (class legislation), is whether the discrimination is
plainly unreasonable. 8 Louisiana discriminated against chiropractors
by requiring them to pass satisfactory examinations in the same subjects that were specified for physicians and surgeons, including surgery
and materia medica. Other statutes provided for the admission of
osteopaths, dentists, chiropodists, and trained nurses without requiring
them to take a full course in materia medica or surgery. In other words,
the osteopaths were favored and the chiropractors were, it would appear, practically prevented from practising in Louisiana. But this
patent discrimination was sustained by the Louisiana Supreme Court.9
It stated: "Were it otherwise the Legislature would be greatly hampered in the exercise of its power to protect the general health and the
public from imposition and fraud. Every group of men who might
get together and evolve some system, designed to restore health, would
be entitled to recognition, and all that could be required of them would
be evidence of good character and a knowledge of such subjects as their
particular school seemed to require, although the Legislature might
deem with reason a knowledge of such subjects wholly insufficient to
entitle any one to treat the sick." " This reasoning by the Louisiana
Regents, (N. Y. 1946) 65 N.E. (2d) 184 (splitting fees with an unlicensed solicitor
of patients).
7
Green v. Blanchard, 138 Ark. 137, 211 S. W. 375 (I919) 5 A.L.R. 94
(1920) (dentist-divided court).
8 Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wash. 146, 259 P. 17 (1927); McNaughton v.
Johnson, 242 U.S. 344, 37 S. Ct. 178 (917); People v. Witte, 315 Ill. z8?, 146
N. E. 178 (1924); 54 A.L.R. 400 (1928); 37 A.L.R. 68o (1925).
9Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Fife, 162 La. 681, III S. 58

(1926); 54 A.L.R. 6oo (1928). While not precisely the same it appears impossible
to reconcile satisfactorily with the Louisiana case People v. Love, 298 Ill. 304, 131
N. E. 809 (1921), and People v. Schaeffer, 310 Ill. 574, 142 N. E. 248 (1924);
i6 A.L.R. 709 (1922).
10 I6z La. 681 at 685, 1II S. 58 (1926).
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Supreme Court does not appeal to this writer as a perfect example of
logic. The states should have the power to deny recognition to schools
of medicine that are not valuable to society.11 That fundamental proposition would hardly be denied by any disinterested person. But should
a state be, permitted to require standards for chiropractors in excess of
those for osteopaths? However, even if the answer to this question
must be in the negative, it would not necessarily follow that Louisiana
could not properly deny admission to chiropractors. Conceivably its
board might have reasonably determined that the chiropractors failed
to present "a diploma from a college in good standing." Perhaps there
was at that time no such college teaching the system known as chiropractic.
Oregon passed a statute that placed severe limitations upon the
advertising permitted by dentists. The Supreme Court of the United
States held that the statute was valid, saying: (i) "Nor has plaintiff
any ground for objection because the particular regulation is limited to
dentists and is not extended to other professional classes. The State
was not bound to deal alike with all these classes, or to strike at all
evils at the same time or in the same way. It could deal with the different professions according to the needs of the public in relation to
each." (2) That defendant was not justified in advertising in the forbidden manner merely because his advertising was truthful. The court
also observed: "The legislature was not dealing with traders incommodities, but with the vital interest of public health, and with a profession treating bodily ills and demanding different standards of
conduct from those which are traditional in the competition of the
"People v. Lewis, 233 Mich. 240, zo6 N. W. 553 (i9z5) (Michigan recognized chiropractors but held that one desiring to practice the system of chiropractic is
not deprived of the equal protection of the laws by requiring him, as a condition for
securing a license, to pass an examination in anatomy, histology, embryology, physiology, chemistry, bacteriology, pathology, diagnosis, hygiene, and public health, although such objects are not taught in chiropractic schools).
The board of regents of Texas University leased land to the city of Galveston
for a municipal hospital, reserving the right to use part of the hospital for clinical
instruction of university medical students. The hospital board in charge of the hospital
excluded licensed osteopathic physicians from using this hospital. But this was held
to be no violation of due process or equal protection. Hayman v. City of Galveston,
273 U. S. 414 at 417, 47 S. Ct. 363 (1927), "We cannot say that a regulation excluding from the conduct of a hospital the devotees of some of the numerous systems or
methods of treating diseases authorized to practice in Texas, is unreasonable or arbi-

trary."
See, for a more general discussion of equal protection, Iowa Eclectic Med. College Assn. v. Schrader, 87 Iowa 659, 55 N. W. 24 (1893); 2o L.R.A. 355 (1893).
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market place .... And the community is concerned in providing safeguards not only against deception, but against practices which would
tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its members into an
unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the least
scrupulous. What is generally called the 'ethics' of the profession is
but the consensus of expert opinion as to the necessity of such standards."' 2
B. Between New and Established Members of a Profession
Probably it is not of much importance now, but in establishing a
standard of education as a condition to securing a license, it is no violation of equal protection to make a reasonable exception in favor of
established practitioners.'V The Minnesota legislature in 1919 revised
its statutes concerning the practice of dentistry. Section 4 of this
revision authorized the board oi dental examiners to suspend or revoke
dental licenses for a number of specified reasons. Section 8 had a
sweeping provision in this language: "provided that the provisions of
this act shall not apply to persons lawfully engaged in the business or
practices of dentistry at the present time." It is a fair guess that the
legislature intended merely to permit dentists licensed before 1919 to
continue to practice without qualifying again for a new license. But the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that section 8 plainly excluded these
dentists from the disciplinary provisions of section 4. This discrimination was a violation of constitutional provisions for equality and thus
made the revision invalid.' 4
C. Among Individual Members of a Profession
In a Florida case, T. K. Jones stated that he had taken three examinations given by the Florida State Board of Dental Examiners; that
he had been thrice notified that he had failed to pass; but that he had
made as high a mark as others who were granted certificates to practice by the board. Accordingly, Jones claimed that he had been refused
a certificate capriciously and from prejudice. After the board's motion
2

Semler
S
v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 6o8 at 61o and
612, 55 S. Ct. 570 (1935).
"I State ex rel. Walker v. Green, I z Ind. 462, 14 N. E. 352 (1887); I36
A. L. R. 219 (I94z). See, also, Fairfield v. Shallenberger, 135 Iowa 615, 113 N. W.
459 (1907) (special license tax on traveling physicians). Cf. State v. Doran, 28 S. D.
486, 134 N. W. 53 (912)
(occupation tax applicable Qnly to nonresident itinerant
physicians invalid).
'4 State v. Luscher, 157 Minn. 192, 195 N. W. 914 (1923).
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to quash thd proceedings had been overruled, the board declined to
give any further answer to Jones' complaint. Thus the actual facts
were not adequately developed. But on the meagre showing it would
appear that the Florida court acted correctly in compelling the board
either to justify its conduct or to issue a certificate to him. To do otherwise would seem to violate the constitutional guaranty of equal protection; but this provision was not mentioned by the Florida Supreme
Court.

15

IV
PREVENTION OF CORPORATE PRACTICE'

A. Validity
Despite a dissenting minority, it"has been generally agreed by the
courts that neither a corporation for profit nor any other unlicensed
person may practise medicine, surgery, or dentistry through licensed
employees. Such a policy by a state does not offend constitutional
provisions."8
B. What is CorporatePractice
Apparently in no state have private corporations for profit made
more determined efforts to practice medicine and dentistry than in
California. They were denied this right when the effort was directly
attempted. Then they made an indirect effort as disclosed by the opinions in People ex rel. State Board of Medical Examiners v. Pacific
Health Corporation,Incorporated." This corporation, for a premium,
agreed to pay the policy holder for medical services rendered to him;
but to obtain this benefit the holder "must, save as to emergency expenses not exceeding $5o, accept a doctor from the list [of physicians
and surgeons approved by the corporation]." This restrictive provision appears to be the main point of difference between this corporation
and other insurance companies which issue the long accepted ordinary
health and accident policy. The defendant, Pacific Health Corporation,
"r York v. State ex rel. Jones, 144 Fla. 216, 197 S. 766 (1940), noted in I
LOYOLA L. REv. 109 (1941). (It is niot clear whether the peremptory writ of mandamus required the board to produce the examination papers of June, 1939 in order
to determine whether relator's grade entitled him to a certificate or whether it required
the board to issue the certificate forthwith.)
Is People by Kerner v. United Medical Service, Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 2oo N. E.
157 (1936); 103 A.L.R. 1240 (1936). The opposite ruling was made in New York
as to a chiropodist: People v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, Inc., 277 N. Y. 151,
13 N. E. (zd) 750 (1938).
17 1? Cal. (zd) 156, 82 P. (2d), 429 (1938); 119 A.L.R. 1290 (1938).
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was operating for profit and was seeking to make as many of its contracts as possible. But the Supreme Court of California held that it
was illegally engaged in the practice of medicine in excess of its corporate powers. The court refused to heed the argument made by the corporation that the doctors on its approved list were independent contractors as opposed to employees in other cases where corporations were

found to be practising medicine. This was rejected as a technical distinction and the court reasoned thus: "The evils of divided loyalty and
impaired confidence would seem to be equally present whether the
doctor received benefits from the corporation in the form of salary or
fees. And freedom of choice is destroyed, and the elements of solicitation of medical business and lay control of the profession are present
whenever the corporation seeks such business from the general public
and turns it over to a special group of doctors." 8 To answer objections
made by the three judges who dissented, that the decision would be a
peril to "fraternal, employee, and hospital associations and various
medical-hospital services[that] have been rendering such services to
their members through doctors employed by them" and also to health
insurance and group medicine, the majority of the court 'was happy to
say: "It is perfectly possible to bring adequate medical service to the
vast numbers of people who now can ill afford it by some means which
will protect both the profession and the public from the evils of corporate control of the practitioner." Then the majority cited, as an
example-of what it had in mind, Butterworth v. Boyd decided the same
day. That case is discussed in the next paragraph.
In 1937 the city and county of San Francisco established a health
service system for all of its employees who were members of the retirement system, including the teachers and employees of the board of
education. The system was to be administered by a board to be elected
by the members of the system. Members of religious sects who believed
in healing by prayer were exempted from the system at their option.
The board had the power to exempt those whose annual salaries exceeded $4,5oo, and those who had otherwise provided for adequate
medical care. The board had the power to adopt (I) a plan for medical
care, (2) for indemnification of the costs of medical care, or (3) for
carrying insurance against such costs. To pay the expense of the system
the board could determine the monthly sum to be deducted from the
compensation of the members. From the fund so obtained all expenses
of the system were to be paid. Members, in seeking medical care, were
8

Id. at 158.
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free to select their physicians, nurses, hospitals, etc., subject to these
restrictions only: (I) the rules and regulations of the board; (2) the
chosen doctor or hospital must render his services pursuant to these
rules and regulations; and (5) the services or supplies must be furnished at uniform rates of compensation to be fixed by the board. But
the board was expressly prohibited from entering into any exclusive
contract for these services. The first board adopted plan number one
for the rendition of medical services and rules and regulations to carry
it into effect. A monthly deduction of $2.50 was made, and then came
a suit to test the constitutionality of the legislation. The Supreme Court
of California, with one judge dissenting, decided that the legislation
was valid despite many objections such - as delegation of legislative
power, due process, equal protection, and religious freedom.' ° It is
hardly to be doubted that the court was happy to announce that the
municipal employees had voted in favor of the system at the outset by a
vote of 7,42,8 to 939 and that: "Over a thousand physicians, a majority of the licensed practitioners in the city, and nearly all of the city's
hospitals, agreed to firnish services under the plan. And petitioners'
brief states that among those who have joined the staffs are the president of the State Board of Health, the president of the California State
Medical Asgociation and past presidents of that association, the president of the San'Francisco County Medical Society and several past
presidents of that society, the president of the American College of
Physicians, and leading members of the staffs of the medical schools
of the University of California and Stanford University."2 " The uncertainty in this opinion is contained in the expression, "rules and regulations of the board." Until these rules and regulations are disclosed
and discussed in a court opinion one cannot be sure of the scope of the
opinion in Butterworth v. Boyd. But it would appear that the decision
sustains the constitutionality of one type of group (socialized) medicine as distinguished from what may be labelled, inexactly, the corporate practice of medicine.
A similar organization in California was known as California
Physicians' Service, a non-profit corporation. The membership consisted of (I) administrative members who exercised administrative
coitrol through the election of the board of trustees; (2) professional
members, duly licensed physicians and surgeons practicing in the state,
who elected the administrative members periodically; and (3) bene'9
20

Butterworth v. Boyd, iz Cal. (zd) 140, 8z P. (zd) 434 (I93 8).
Id. at 146.
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ficiary members, viz., those.who upon the payment of monthly dues are
entitled to secure from any professional member the necessary medical
and surgical services. "Professional membership is open to any physidan or surgeon licensed to practice his profession in this state upon his
agreeing to abide by the rules of the corporation that all compensation
for services rendered a beneficiary member shall be paid upon a pro
rata basis out of the monthly funds collected from the beneficiary members." But a professional member could refuse to accept any person as
a patient. It was stated by the corporation that approximately five
thousand California physicians and surgeons were members and that
one hundred thousand persons, increasing at the rate of fifteen hundred
per month, had become beneficiary members. Two years after the California Physicians' Service was incorporated, the California legislature
passed an act applicable to the service that provided: (i) at least one
fourth of all physicians and surgeons had to become members; (z)
membership in such a non-profit corporation upon a uniform basis is
available to all licensed members of a particular profession; and (3)
voting by proxy and cumulative voting are prohibited. The California
Physicians' Service was declared by the Court of Appeals, First District, to be validly operating under California laws and not to be
engaging in the insurance business or in the corporate practice of medicine. 2 In the opinion of the court is the following language: "There
is no essential difference between the Group Health Association, the
San Francisco Health Service, and California Physicians' Service in so
far as the scheme of operations is concerned except that in the first two
the administrative management is in a board selected by the beneficiary
members, whereas in the latter it is in a board selected by the professional members. All are non-profit, semi-charitable organizations conof affording necessary medical care to
ducted for the primary purpose
22
those of small income."

The above expression "Group Health Association" refers to the
opinions in Group Health Association v. Moor and Jordan v. Group
HealihAssociation. The first of these two cases decided that the Group
Health As~ociation, organized in the District of Columbia, was not
practising the healing art or engaged in the business of insurance in
violation of law." The second case, in the court of appeals, affirmed
21 California Physicians' Service v. Garrison, (Cal. App. 1945) 155 P. (2d) 885.
22

Id. at 894.

28 Group Health Assn. v. Moor, (D. C. D. C. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 44-5.
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this decision as to the second point only" No appeal was taken from
the decision on the first point. From the two opinions these facts appear
concerning the Group Health Association. It was organized as a nonprofit corporation to provide its members and their dependents with
medical services, surgery, hospitalization, and medical and surgical
supplies. There were specified exceptions and limitations on the services. Membership was limited to civil employees of the executive
branch of the United States government service. Members were elected
by the boards of trustees, who in turn were elected by the members,
except two chosen by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, all from
the membership. Members paid monthly dues and they could be
expelled by the trustees who controlled and managed the corporate
affairs.. The relationship between the corporation and the physicians
was not very dear. It had discontinued its former practice of having
a staff of full-time salaried physicians in favor of a system whereby the
physicians under oral contracts "apparently .devote only a portion of
their time to the work of Group Health, the remainder being devoted
to private practice, although it seems to be contemplated that some
physicians will give full time to the work. They receive fixed annual
compensation, paid in monthly instalments, not specific fees for each
treatment or case." _It operated a clinic and provided for home treatment, if necessary. Hospitalization to a limited extent was secured by
arrangement with independent established hospitals. But it does not
appear that Group Health provided that any licensed practitioner who
would abide by the rules and regulations was entitled to be on the
panel approved by Group Health for calling by its members. This
absent feature seems to be highly important under the California decisions. The court' of appeals was apparently not concerned with this
fact since its task was to decide whether Group Health was in the insurance business. The decision of the district court that Group Health
was not practising the healing art was expressed in a brief opinion that
did not consider this possible objection. It was the conclusion of the
court of appeals that doctors who made contracts with Group Health
were "independent contractors" required to exercise their own judgment entirely independently as to diagnosis and treatment.
24

Jordan v. Group Health Assn., (C. C. D. C. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 239. See,
however, United States v. American Medical Assn., (C. C. D. C. I94o) 11o F. (2d)
703, where the circuit court of appeals was unable to say that the Group Health
Association, Inc., as described in the indictment before the court, was illegally practising medicine.
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This is an appropriate place to ask what is the essential difference
between the Group Health Association in the District of Columbia,
the California Physicians' Service, and the San Francisco health service
system on the one hand and the Pacific Health Corporation and the
United Medical Service in Illinois on the other hand? The best answer
appears to be the profit motive with its danger of divided loyalty,
intellectual dishonesty, and shoddy medical service. This is a sufficient
differentiation on paper. Yet it seems fair to observe that a non-profit
association cannot be wholly immune to expense, to making ends meet,
and administrative success. And these are factors that will hamper and
probably prevent the attainment of the high ideal of entirely adequate
medical service for those with low incomes. So it is feared that in
practice there would not be a great difference between approved nonprofit corporations and disapproved profit corporations if the latter
had been generally permitted to develop. Some of the latter probably
would have developed into institutions with good if not excellent
records for service. It can hardly be doubted, however, that many of
them would have been of poor quality and even disgraceful. Thus
would have arisen a need for public supervision and that, in an approved fashion, is not easy to obtain or cheap. Accordingly, the final
conclusion is that the non-profit cooperative way is the superior method.
If that method proves to be successful there will be little or no regret
that the "practice of medicine" by the profit corporation has been
generally forbidden."

V
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Not only is a physician entitled to substantive due process as set
forth above, but he is entitled to procedural due process before his
substantive rights can be adversely affected. Thus, the Ohio Supreme
Court held that even though a statute provided that a license could not
be revoked except upon notice and hearing; nevertheless it was unconstitutional because it failed to provide "whereby the attendance of witnesses could be required or their testimony procured." 26
Missouri apparently was more careful than Ohio and provided by
statute that testimony could be taken by deposition and used in the
trial of a physician before the state board of health. Officers who take
25 See the opinion in United States v. American Medical Assn., (C.C.D.C. 194o )
iio F. (2d) 703 at 714. Contrast 27 MARQ. L. REv. 135 (1943).
2
'Jewell v. McCann, 95 Ohio St. 191 at 193, 116 N. E. 42 (1917).
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depositions were authorized to compel witnesses to attend and give
their testimony. The Supreme Court of the United States held that
this was sufficient for procedural due process even fhough the board
had no power to compel witnesses to appear in person before the board
and there give their testimony."
Perhaps the most colossal quack to disgrace thd American medical
profession was John R. Brinkley, the goat gland surgeon, who barely
,missed election as governor of Kansas, even though'he ran on an
independent ticket,-a remarkable feat that was equally remarkable
proof of the emotional gullibility of too many Americans. After the
State Board of Medical Registration and Examination of ,Kansas filed
a complaint to revoke his license, Dr. Brinkley sought to enjoin the
board from holding a hearing because, among other complaints, the
board lacked the subpoena power. He failed to obtain an injunction.28
The Kansas Supreme Court said that' "With the exception of a sporadic case to be noted later, no court has eyer declared that [an] opportunity to present [a] defense and be heard in its support requires the
adjective element of compulsory process." The exceptional case mentioned by the Kansas court was the case decided by the Ohio Supreme
Court. The Kansas Supreme Court was caustic in its adverse comment,
viz.: "The decision is authority for nothing but the fact that it was
rendered, and this court declines to follow it." 9
In 1930 the Kansas board revoked Brinkley's license. Then Brinkley sought to enjoin this revocation, claiming that it denied him his
rights under the national Constitution. He was unsuccessful but he
confronted the federal courts with a difficult decision." His best argument was that the members of the Kansas medical board were prejudiced against him before the heating started and that some of them
were active in making the complaint against him. The circuit court
of appeals admitted "that some of the board had expressed such prejudice, and doubtless all were in fact prejudiced." This conclusion
was explained by the fact that Brinkley's methods of publicity, particularly the use of the radio, made previous knowledge of these facts
and opinions concerning their violation of professional standards almost
inevitable. Thus the court was confronted by the necessity of making
a choice between a decision in favor of Brinkley, because the only body
Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S. 40, 46 S. Ct. 384 (i9z6).
20 Brinkley v. Hassig, 13o Kan. 874, 289 P. 64 (930).
27

2

9Id. at 881.
80 Brinkley v. Hassig. (C. C. A. ioth, 1936) 83 F. (zd) 351.
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that could try him was disqualified by prejudice, or a decision adverse
to Brinkley. In this unhappy dilemma the circuit court of appeals

chose not to let Brinkley go "Scot-free" and thus proclaimed that a
doctor could not by sensational methods of publicity oust the only body
with jurisdiction over him. And yet it is unfortunate for us to admit
that a person had to be tried before a board that undoubtedly was prejudiced. Normally, courts could be expected to deny such a conclusion."

It is implied in the preceding discussion concerning procedural due
process that before adverse action is taken against a medical man, he
is entitled to a notice and a hearing. So is the law written; 82 but it is
also true that some courts have had an unfriendly attitude toward
administrative tribunals and thus have been unnecessarily strict and
legalistic in applying this sensible rule. 8

VI
MONOPOLY IN MEDICAL PRACTICE:
APPLICABILITY OF THE SHERMAN ACT

The American Medical Association and others were indicted for
a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Anti-trust
Act. The Group Health Association of the District of CQlumbia was
the alleged victim of the conspiracy. The district court sustained
demurrers to the indictment, holding that medical practice is not a
trade within the meaning of section 3 of the Sherman Act.8 4 However, this decision was reversed and remanded by the circuit court
of appeals.8 5 It held that "a restraint imposed upon the lawful practice of medicine-and a fortiori-upon the operation of hospitals and
of a lawful organization for the financing of medical services to its
members, is just as much in restraint of trade as if it were directed
,; "Disqualification on the Ground of Bias as Applied to Administrative Tribunas," 23 CA. BAR REv. 453 (94.5); Re Segal and Smith, 5 F.C.C. 3 (0937).
State v. Schultz, ii Mont. 429, 28 P. 643 (1892).
s 8 Dyment v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. App. z6o, 207 P. 409, 412
(1922); Bley v. Board of Dental Examiners, IZO Cal. App. 4z6, 7 P. (2d) 1053
(932); Kalman v. Walsh, 355 Ill. 341, 189 N. E. V5 (i934.); Abrams v. Jones,
35 Idaho 532, 207 P. 724 (1922).
84 United States v. American Medical Assn., (D. C. D. C. 1939) 28 F. Supp.
752.
88 United States v. American Medical Assn., (C. C. D. C. 1940) 11o F. (2d)
703. See The Medical Profession and the Sherman Act, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1034
(940).
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against any other occupation or employment or business." " The
opinion condensed the charge against the medical societies in this
fashion: that they conspired to prevent the successful operation of
Group Health's plan, and that the -steps by which this was - to be
effectuated were as follows: "(I) to impose restraints on physicians
affiliated with Group Health by threat of expulsion or actual expulsion
from the societies; (2) to deny them the essential professional contacts with other physicians, and (3) to use the coercive power of the
societies to deprive them of hospital facilities for their patients." "
Upon the trial which followed, the American Medical Association and
the Medical Society of the District of Columbia were convicted. They
appealed but the convictions were affirmed, first, by the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia and then by the Supreme
Court. 8 The latter court avoided a decision on the "question whether
a physician's practice of his, profession constitutes trade under § 3 of
the Sherman Act." But it held that- "Group Health is a membership
corporation engaged in business or-trade. Its corporate activity is the
consummation of the cooperative effort of its members to obtain for
themselves and their families medical service and hospitalization on
a risk-sharing prepaynient basis. The corporation collects its funds
from members. With these funds physicians are employed and hospitalization procured on behalf of members and their dependents.
The fact that it is cooperative, and procures service and facilities on
behalf of its members only, does not remove its activities from the
sphere of business.
"If, as we hold, the indictment charges a single conspiracy to restrain and obstruct this business it charges a conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce within the statute. As the Court of Appeals properly remarked, the calling or occupation of the individual physicians
charged as defendants is immaterial if the purpose and effect of their
conspiracy was such obstruction and restraint of the business of Group
Health." "
At the same time that the American Medical Association was before
the courts, a case was decided in Kentucky that may present another
problem in restraint of trade. Dr. Hughes was a competent and-qualiiO F. (2d) 703 at 711.
Id. at 711.
"SAmerican Medical Assn. v. United States, (C. C. D. C. I94Z) 13o F. (2d)
233, 317 U. S. 5i9, 63 S. Ct. 326 (194-3). See comments in 29 CORN. L. Q. 271
(1943); 29 VA. L. REv. 832 (1943), i8 TENN. L. REv. 393 (1944).
Ss 317 U. S. 519 at 528.
36
1
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fled surgeon with a long and successful experience and with no proof
against him of unprofessional conduct. In 1939 the superintendent of
the Good Samaritan Hospital wrote to Dr. Hughes that in order for
the hospital to continue as an accredited hospital, it would be necessary
for him to have the indorsement of the proper board of officers of the
American College of Surgeons. Apparently, Dr. Hughes was justified
in interpreting this letter as denying him the use of the operating room
in the hospital unless he ceased to perform some types of operations,
for the letter was based on the fact that Dr. Hughes, "a general practitioner, had invaded the field of the specialist by performing certain
operations, which are under rules usually performed in the hospital
by surgeons classified as specialists, and such continued practice would
take the hospital from the accredited list." 4 0 Dr. Hughes sought an
injunction to restrain the hospital from interfering with his practice.
An injunction was refused, the court saying: "We have before us
merely one question-his vested right to operate in the rooms of
appellee hospital, when it for no manifested arbitrary or capricious
reason, but in the exercise of a reasonable discretion to maintain its institution on an accredited basis, decided otherwise. Appellait has failed to
demonstrate that he has such a vested right, either by contract, inherently or as vouchsafed by any constitutional provision, hence we
are of the opinion that the chancellor properly dissolved restraining
order and denied permanent injunction." 4 '
There was no discussion of the possibility that the arrangement
between the hospital and the American College of Surgeons was an
agreement in restraint of trade and a possible violation of the Sherman
Act, to say nothing of Kentucky statutes. Was the arrangement one
that can be differentiated from the conduct condemned in the Group
Health case because it is a reasonable restraint, since the primary, if not
the sole, purpose was to maintain proper standards for hospitals? The

present writer is not sufficiently versed in the complications of the
Sherman Act to venture an answer to this question.

VII
COMPULSORY MEDICAL ATTENTION

Professor Thomas Reed Powell has written about the constitutional aspects of compulsory vaccination and sterilization. But he conz89 Ky. 123 at 125, 158 S.W. (?d) 159 (1942).
41 Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 789 Ky. 123 at
159 (I94z), reviewed in 31 Ky. L. J. 197 (I943).
40

1z9,

158 S. W. (2d)
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fined his
observations to cases decided by the United States Supreme
42
Court.

Not all of our state courts have been so favorably inclined toward
the validity of compulsory medical treatment. The bulk of the litigation has concerned itself with vaccination against small pox, as a condition of school attendance. So far as the writer is aware no state statute
directly requiring such a vaccination has been held to be'beyond the
power of the state. But Illinois, not usually listed as politically and
judicially progressive, has three cases in which a vaccination require-ment was held to be invalid as beyond the delegated authority of the
public body which attempted to enforce the requirement. 8 The mental
obtuseness of these decisions is demonstrated to some extent by the
opinion in a later Illinois case." But even there the earlier decisions
were distinguished because in the later case there was an epidemic of
small-pox, viz., about forty cases in a city of approximately, twelve
thousand population. Presumably there are those who can view with
sweet tolerance the attitude of a supreme court that permitted the
protection of vaccination only after the disease was a serious problem."'
A Wisconsin decision fully 'supports the earlier Illinois decisions and
more definitely condemned the vaccination regulation as unconstitutional." Fortunately, however, it appears to be agreed tiat by one
method or another most vaccination statutes and regulations have been
hfild to be valid by the state courts, despite constitutional claims of
42 "Compulsory
REv. 253 (194).

Vaccination and Sterilization: Constitutional Aspects," zi N. C.-L.

67, 4-7 N. E. 8x (1897) (A rule of State Board of
Potts v. Breen, I67 Ill.
compelling
vaccination
of
school children is unreasonable and beyond the power
Health
of the board where smallpox does not exist in the community and there was no reason
for apprehension); Lawbaugh v. Board of Education, 177 Ill. 572, 5z N. E. 850
422, 84 N. E. io46(1899); People ex rel. Jenkins v. Board of Education, 234 Ill.
(1908).
See also Burroughs v.Mortenson, 31z Ill. 163, 143 N. E. 40 (9z4.), and
People v.Tait,-261 iIl.
197, 103 N. E. 750 (1913).
44 Hagler v.Lamer, z84 Ii. 547, 12o N. E. 575 (918).
4' The decision and the attitude of the Supreme Court of Illinois was, much better
422, 134 N. E. 815 (1922). There
in People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 30z Ill.
itwas held that a typhoid carrier had been legally placed under a quarantine which
required her to remain in her home and forbade her to prepare food for anyone except her husband and forbade anyone to come into her home, as a roomer or otherwise,
unless he had been immunized from typhoid fever.
46 State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 70 N. W. 347 (1897). See
a criticism of the Burdge case in Ex parte Company, io6 Ohio St. 50 at 59, 139
N. E. zo4.(i9z2).
43
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equal protection, due process, non-delegation of legislative power,
free public schools, religious and civil liberty, and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.""
There was difficulty in Illinois in securing a statute that compelled
under a penalty the dropping into the eyes of a baby within an hour
after its birth I per cent solution of silver nitrate, or some equally
effective prophylactic. Even though the purpose was to save eye-sight
by preventing the disease of opthalmia neonatorum, the AttorneyGeneral of Illinois wrote an opinion declaring the proposed statute
to be unconstitutional for interfering with the liberty of parents in
rearing their children. The Governor accordingly vetoed the bill.48
But this ridiculous position was too much for Illinois. The next legislature passed another bill and it was approved by Governor Homer.
As far as is known no court test has been made of such legislation.
In November, 1919, George Buckner was in custody in the Topeka,
Kansas, city jail. The city health officer, acting under a state statute,
the rules of the state board of health, and a Topeka ordinance, examined Buckner and then certified that he was infected with chronic
gonorrhea. Then followed an isolation order whereby Buckner would
be sent to the Kansas State Quarantine Camp for men at Lansing for
treAtment. Buckner sought his release through a writ of habeas corpus.
He failed and the Kansas Supreme Court held that the legislation
was valid.'
New York in 1922 passed an act under which a "neglected" child
was one whose parent refuses, when able to do so, to provide necessary,
medical, surgical, institutional, or hospital care for such child. The
Children's Court had the power to order a child to be examined by a
physician and whenever such a child appeared to be in need of medical
or surgical care, to make an order for such treatment. Helen Vasko
47 Hartman v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 S. 737 (934); 93 A.L.R. 1413
(1934). See also Zucht v. King, 26o U. S. 174, 43 S. Ct. 24 (1922).
4ISee an editorial in 26 ILL. L. REv. 785 (1932). People v. Pierson, 176
N. Y. 2oi, 68 N. E. 243 (903),

holds that a statute that makes it a misdemeanor to

wilfully omit medical attendance for an adopted child did not violate the father'4p
constitutional freedom of religion even though he believed in divine healing and not
in physicians. See also Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. Rep. 11o, ii6 P. 345 (I911).
49 Ex Parte McGee, 105 Kan. 574, 185 P. 14- (1919).

See also People ex rel.

Krohn v. Thomas, 231 N. Y. S. 271, 133 Misc. 145 (1928) (detention for blood
test); In re Caselli, 6z Mont. 201, 204 P. 364 (1922); Ex parte Company, 1o6 Ohio
St. 50, 139 N. E. 2o4.(1922); In're Travers, 48 Cal. App. 764, 192 P. 454 (1920).
Contrast Wragg v. Griffin, 185 Iowa 243, 170 N. W. 400 (1919), which appears to
be a reactionary decision.

' 7o6

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

I[ VOL.

44

was brought before this court upon the petition of the Westchester
County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. Medical
examination disclosed that Helen, two years old, had a glioma of the
retina of the left eye, which was permanently blind; that the growth
was probably of a malignant nature and will increase until it fills the
eyeball; that it will then burst through the eyeball and protrude between the lids; and that in all probability, if left to nature, it will
follow the optic nerve into the brain, thus causing her death. An
operation to remove the left eye was recommended with the advice
that statistics show a cure in about 50 per cent of the cases. But Helen's
parents refused to permit the operation, the mother saying that she
would rather have the child as she is now. "God gave her the baby
and God can do what he wants." This attitude of the parents was
thought by the New York court to be arbitrary. Accordingly, the
statute was held to be constitutional and the order adjudging the child
to be neglected was affirmed. As a necessary inference from the opinion,
the trial court's order included a direction that the operation be performed and this was also approved."
Patricia Hudson presented a sad case. She had a congenital deformity consisting of an abnormal growth of her entire left arm which
made that arm much longer and much larger than the right arm and
rendered it absolutely useless. The minority of the court from an
examination of a photograph concluded, that the left arm was ten
times the size of the other arm and nearly as large as her body. The
medical testimony was that Patricia appeared to be frail; that she will
remain in a rather weakened condition, an easy prey for infection; that
her heart is burdened by reason of having to pump blood through the
large left arm; and that her chest and spine are becoming deformed
from carrying the enormous weight. Both physicians concluded that
there was no remedy except amputation which they recommended,
even though "there is a fair degree of risk of life involved in the
operation." Patricia came before a juvenile court on the complaint of
an adult sister that Patricia was not receiving needed medical care.
o In rd Vasko, 263 N. Y. S. 552,

238

App. Div. i8

(i93 3). This decision

was the subject of comment in 12 TENN. L. REv. 59 (1933); 4 BosToN UNiv. L.
REv. 196 (1934); 28 ILL. L. REv. 556 (i933).
In re Rotkowitz, 25 N. Y. S. (2d') 624, 175 Misc. 948 (i941), is a similar
decision upon an order for an operation to correct and prevent extension of a leg
deformity induced by poliomyelitis. The mother of the child petitioned for the order
and the court found that the child was neglected by the father who would not consent to the operation. He gave no reason for his opposition.
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Patricia was then eleven years old. Her brothers and sisters testified
that Patricia's deformed arm made her shy and sensitive and deprived
her of a normal life. She did not attend school because other children
jeered at her. Patricia apparently did not testify but she frequently
cried and stated that she wished to have her left arm removed. Three
of her sisters testified that they favored the amputation even though
they realized that Patricia might not survive the operation. Her father
was an invalid and a weak character. He testified that he would not
object to the amputation and also stated: "I am leaving it in the
judge's hands." Her mother strongly opposed the operation, not
because of religious scruples, even though she had had a divine healer
for Patricia, but because of the danger of causing Patricia's death.
The trial judge ordered the amputation but the Washington Supreme Court by a vote of six to three reversed the order.5 ' The majority opinion stated that the legal problem presented was whether
Patricia's mother could be deprived of the control of Patricia for a
sufficient period of time to subject Patricia to the operation which, in
the judgment of the juvenile court, Patricia's welfare demanded.
The answer to this question was in the negative. Was it correct?
One cannot give a negative answer to this last question without admitting that the Washington statute was in no sense as satisfactory and
direct as the New York statute previously considered. Indeed it seems
necessary to admit that the Washington juvenile court act was not
drafted with any such problem specifically in mind. It has no express
language providing, for medical or surgical care. But it defined a
dependent child as one who is destitute, or whose home, by reason of
the neglect of a parent, is an unfit place for such child, or one whose
parent does not properly provide for such child, etc. The minority
opinion argued that this language was sufficient and came to these
conclusions: (i) "Medical services are necessary and a child, who is
not furnished such services is destitute"i and (2) since Patricia was in
need of surgical attendance she was destitute and the juvenile court
possessed the power to order the amputation.
In reaching'these conclusions the minority relied on that part of
the act which declared: "After acquiring jurisdiction over any child,
the court shall have power to make... any order, which in the judg5' In re Hudson, 13 Wash. (2d) 673, 126 P. (2d) 765 (1942). The comment
on this decision in 28 IOWA L. REv. 372 (1943) is mildly critical: "Even in the absence of statute, the state's right of guardianship is superior to that of the parent if the
assertion of the right is necessary for the welfare of the child. This authority should
extend to an order for surgical care in a proper case." Id. at 374.
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ment of the court, would promote the child's health and welfare....1"

The. majority of the court appeared not to attach much value to this
provision. Instead, it arguedthat under the same section, if the juvenile court found a child to be dependent, it was necessary to place the
child under the legal control of somebody. "But the court may not,
over objection of the natural guardian, or legal guardian or adoptive
parents to whom custody and control of the child are awarded by the
court, subject the child to a surgical operation." "
Thus it is possible that the decision is primarily procedural in its
significance. Instead of directly ordering the, amputatiofr, the juvenile
court should have proceeded thus: (I) made a finding that Patricia
was a neglected child under the statute; (2) made an order depriving
her mother and father of her control and custody, taking care to have
them transferred to a person, such as one of the adult sisters, who
favored the amputation; (3) entertained a petition fikom this guardian
asking for an amputation order, and; (4)made an amputation order
in granting this petition. Whether this procedure would have been
approved by the Supreme Court of Washington is doubtful. Despite
the command of the legislature to give the juvenile court act a liberal
construction, the majority of the court apparently failed to'do so, or to
heed the legal philosophy expressed by the New York court in the
Rotkowitz case, even though it quoted this passage: "The law is a
growth. It could not serve the purposes of man and his needs were
it static, inflexible and rigid. Like life, the law constantly undergoes
change--change which is imposed by life upon law."' " In the course
of an unnecessarily long opinion there is one paragraph in the Washington opinion that probably explains, beyond any merely logical setting forth of its reasons, the basic philosophy or perhaps the religious
iprejudicd of the majority of the Washington court. It is worth quoting:
"As we read the evidence it is admitted by all concerned that there
is a grave possibility that the child may not survive the ordeal of amputation; nevertheless, every one except the child's mother is willing,
desirous, that the child be required to undergo the operation. Implicit
in their position is their opinion that it would, be preferable that the
child die instead of going through life handicapped by the enlarged,
512
The court quoted at 7Z8.
1932)

Italics the court's. Wash. Rev. Stat (Remington,

§ 1978.10.

58 i3 Wash. (zd) 673 at 712.
5425 N. Y. S. (2d) 624 at 625, 175 Misc. 948 (1941).
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deformed left arm. That may be to some today the humane, and in
the future it may be the generally accepted view. However, we have
not advanced or retrograded to the stage where, in the name of mercy,
we may lawfully decide that one shall be deprived of life rather than
continue to exist crippled or burdened with some abnormality. That
right of decision is a prerogative of the Creator." This language, particularly the last sentence, reminds one of the excuse given by the
mother of Helen Vasko in one of the New York cases. It was an excuse
that the New York court thought was arbitrary. It is also odd that
the majority of the Washington court criticized Patricia's mother, "who
loves her child devotedly" for seeking "to shift responsibility of decision to the child at some future time, a present responsibility of the
mother, a sacred duty the mother shirks." In any event it appears
dear that despite a few vague references to constitutional rights, the
Washington court did not decide Patricia's case on the theory that
some principle of constitutional law would prevent the Washington
legislature from amending its juvenile court act to conform to the
New York acts. But it is regrettable that the majority of the Washington Supreme Court decided in favor of a static rather than a progressive view.
VIII
METHODS OF ENFORCEMENT

A.

Criminal Sanction

The normal method of compulsion if a person practices medicine
or surgery without securing.a license or after his license has been revoked or suspended is through a criminal proceeding with a jury trial.
This method has not always been adequate. The statutory penalty
may be so mild that it fails to deter some hardy individuals. More
often, it seems, some quacks have a popular appeal and it is difficult
if not impossible to convict them before a jury with sufficient frequency.
B.

Injunction

Iowa passed a statute that piovided that a person who violated a
law requiring a license for the practice of his profession could be restrained by a permanent injunction. This was in addition to a statute
that made a medical practitioner subject to a fine and imprisonment
for practising without a license. G. E. Fray became the defendant in
an action to enjoin him from practising without a license. He complained that the first Iowa statute was unconstitutional because it de-
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prived him of a jury trial as guaranteed by the Iowa constitution. But
the Supreme Court ruled against him. The importance of this decision
lies in the fact that an equity rather than law court issues an injunction and that an equity court is not compelled to call a jury to determine the facts and very rarely does so. The assumption is that an
equity judge has a higher I.Q. than the average jury, knows better
from his experience how to evaluate evidence, and is less subject to
prejudices and emotions. It is believed that quacks have less chance of
avoiding the license law if the case is decided without a jury. In case
the injunction issues, a claimed violation of the injunction decree will
again be decided by the equity judge without the necessary use of a
jury, unless a statute so requires.-This method of enforcement of profpssional standards is also likely to be more speedy than a criminal
proceeding. The Iowa Supreme Court admitted that this method
could not be used in the ordinary prosecution of crimes. But for a long
time equity courts have asserted jurisdiction over nuisances and certain
harms to property. Here the Iowa court made use of these analogies
in favor of the public health and refused to hold the Iowa statute unconstitutional. 5 Other states have reached the same result and some
of them have done so without the aid of a statute like the Iowa statute." Still other states have refused to grant injunction decrees, holding that the criminal process would have to suffice." In the last group
of states three of the four cases concerned chiropractors. In the Illinois
case it was asserted by the attorney general that some of the fifty-two
individual defendants had been tried, convicted, and sentencedi that
after paying their fines or serving their terms of imprisonment they
returned and continued their practice, and that the Universal Chiropractors' Association collected dues from its members and paid all
fines, costs, and attorneys' fees, thus creating disrespect for the law
making it unlawful to treat human ailments without a license.
.

" State v. Fray, zi4 Iowa 53, 24.1 N. W. 663 (1932).
See Heilman, "Legal
Control of Medical Charlatanism," 22 N. C. L. REV. 23 (1943), discussing and comparing the use of criminal prosecution, quo warranto, and injunction, and 81 A.L.R.

292 (932).

" State ex rel. La Prade v. Smith, 43 Ariz.
A. L. R. 173 (1934).

131, z9 P. (2d)

718 (i93);

92

'7 Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, io6 S. E. 792 (I92i); Redmond v. State ex rel.
Attorney General, 152 Miss. 54, 118 S. 360 (1928) (recommendation that state
proceed by information to abate nuisance with a jury trial); State v. Maltby, io8 Neb.
578, x88 N. W. I75 (1922); People ex rel. Shepardson v. The Universal Chiroprac-.
tors' Assn., 302 Ill. 228, 134 N. E. 4 (I922).
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Ix
LIMITATIONS ON MEDICAL PRACTICE

B.

Use of Spiritous Liquor
Dr. Samuel W. Lambert, "a distinguished physician" in 1922 in
New York sought to enjoin a federal prohibition director from interfering with his practice of prescribing vinous or spirituous liquors to
his patients for medical purposes. The director was acting under congressional statutes which strictly limited the amount of liquor which
physicians could prescribe. Dr. Lambert claimed that his constitutional
right as a physician had been infringed even though, according to the
majority of the court, he belonged to the minority group of physicians
who believed that liquor had value as a therapeutic agent. A bare
majority of the Supreme Court of the United States decided that the
statutes were not arbitrary. Accordingly Dr. Lambert was denied
judicial relief." The minority of the Court challenged the assertion by
the majority of the Court that the views of the medical profession concerning vinous and spirituous, as distinguished from malt liquors were
opposed to their use as medicine. The minority of the Court, accordingly, proceeded on the premise that vinous and spirituous liquors are
of medical value.
B. Use of Narcotics
Linder v. United States" should be contrasted with the Lambert
case. Dr. Linder sold to a known female addict one morphine tablet
and three cocaine tablets. His expectation was that the addict would
administer them to herself in divided doses over a period of time.
Nevertheless, he was convicted of violating the Harrison Narcotic
Law. This conviction was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals but
was reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court. It is difficult to
interpret the decision and opinion of the latter court. The opinion
hardly seems justified in assuming "the doctor's good faith" and the
wisdom of his action according to medical standards. It would appear
that the decision resulted from the following factors: (i) it was a
trivial case; (2) the Supreme Court has been closely divided as to
the constitutionality of the Harrison Narcotic Law; and (3) it was
announced that the law, a taxing act with penal provisions, must be
5

Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U. S. 581, 47 S. Ct. 210 (I9z6).

Caldwell, "Early Legislation Regulating The Practice of Medicine," 18 ILL. L.

REv.

225 (1923), is of general interest.
59 268 U. S. 5, 45 S. Ct. 446 (1925).
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strictly construed. The court also announced that "direct control of
medical practice in the states is beyond the power of the federal govSernment.". On the whole it is believed that the Linder case is of no
particular importance as a precedent.
C.

Use of Contraceptives

There appears to be no doubt that the dispensing of contraceptives
may be prohibited generally. To what extent, however, may physicians
be compelled to accept such a prohibition? On the basis of the decided
0 But it seems
cases no final answer to this question will be ventured.*
fair to observe that at least two recent decisions are unfavorable to the
asserted constitutional right of physicians to prescribe the use of contraceptives even though they honestly believe that the use of contraceptives is desirable or necessary to protect the patient's health or
life. Under this sort of a decision it would seem to follow that the
patient has no constitutional right to have a physician advise him :fs
to the necessity of using a contraceptive.
The first of these two decisions is Commonwealth v. Gardnerwhich
affirmed the conviction of a physician, a nurse, and two trained social
workers. All worked for the North Shore Mothers' Health Office, a

charitable organization. Two of them worked without pay and the
contraceptive devices and medicine were sold and given in the office in
accordance with the physician's instructions. No question was made
concerning the physician's good faith. That seemed to be assumed.
Despite that, the ruling of the trial court that these facts constituted
no defense was approved. It was also held that the Massachusetts
statute, prohibiting the dispensation of contraceptives, must be inter-

preted without qualification as applicable to physicians, and that, so
interpreted, it was constitutional. 6 The Supreme Court of the United
States blasted the appeal in this case by a dismissal "for the want of
a substantial federal question." Nothing more was said and that would
seem to be the equivalent of saying that the Supreme Court agreed
with the Massachusetts court that the state statute as applied did not
violate the national Constitution, including the due process clause."
60
See McConnell v. Knoxville, 172 Tenn. 190, 110 S.W. (2d) 478 (1937);
113 A.L.R. 970 (1938).
61 Commonwealth v.Gardner, 300 Mass. 372 i N. E. (zd) 222 (1938). 6

z6o (I939), is critical of this decision. See also 50 YALE L. J.
68? (194); 37 MicH. L. REV. 317 (1938); 7 G Eo. WASH. L. REv. 255 (1938);
UNiv. Cm.L. REv.

16 N. Y.-UNIv. L. Q. 149 (1938).
, 62 Gardner v. Commonwealth

(1938).

of Massachusetts, 305 U. S. 559, 59 S. Ct. 90
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Connecticut had a similar statute. Wilder Tileston, a licensed physician, sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether he was
entitled to prescribe contraceptives for married women living with
their husbands in the following cases: (i) patient is suffering from
high blood pressure; if pregnancy occurred there would be imminent
danger of toxemia of pregnancy which would have a 25 per cent chance
of killing her; (2) patient is suffering from an arrested case of tuberculosis of the lungs of an acute and treacherous type so that if she
should become pregnant such condition would be likely to light up
the disease and set back her recovery for several years, and might result in her death; (3) patient is in good health except in so far as she
has been weakened by having had three pregnancies" in about twentyseven -months and a new pregnancy would probably have a serious
effect upon her general health and might result in permanent disability. Despite the appealing nature of these cases the Supreme Court
of Connecticut decided that the statutes forbade Dr. Tileston from
prescribing contraceptives for these patients even though that was his
professional judgment. It also decided that the statutes, as interpreted,
were constitutional." Why? Because a physician in such cases need
not prescribe contraceptives. All he needs to do is to advise his patients
to refrain from sexual intercourse for the duration. Observe this language of the court: "The claim of the state on this point comes down,
then, to a consideration of whether abstinence from intercourse is a
reasonable and practicable method of preventing the unfortunate consequences. Certainly it is a sure remedy. Do the frailties of human
nature and the uncertainties of human passions render it impracticable?
That is a question for the legislature, and we cannot say it could not
believe that the husband and wife would and should refrain when
they both knew that intercourse would very likely result in a pregnancy which might bring about the death of the wife." Would and
should! The will and the morality! This writer does not believe that
either the will or obedience to the moral precept will exist in many
instances. And he is inclined to believe that this significant restriction
on freedom of belief and action, based upon a lack of realism as to
sexual relations, would be better condemned as unconstitutional.
The Connecticut decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Its decision was narrowly confined to a point of pro-

""Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A. (2d) 582 (1942). Two of the
five judges dissented on the interpretation of the statute; but they said nothing about
its constitutionality.
See 2o BoSroN UNIV. L. REv. 551 (1940); 3 UNrv. DET. L. J. 216 (1939).
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cedure. Curiously, the attorneys for Dr. Tileston had raised in the
Connecticut court only the question whether the statutes deprived "any
person of life without due process of law." The Supreme Court of the
United States held that "the proceedings in the state courts present
no constitutional question which appellant has standing to assert. The
sole constitutional attack upon the statutes under the Fourteenth
Amendment is confined to their deprivation of life-obviously not
appellant's [Tileston's] but his patients'. There is no allegation or
proof that appellant's life is in danger. His patients are not parties to
this proceeding and there is no basis on Which we can say that he has
standing to secure an adjudication of his patients' constitutional right
to life, which they do not assert in their own behalf. .

...
No

question

is raised in the record with respect to the deprivation of appellants'
liberty or property in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment." "'
e4 Tileston v. Uflman, 318 U. S. 44 at 46, 63 S. Ct. 493 (I943).

